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WORLEY v. COLUMBIA GAS, INC.: ADVICE OF
COUNSEL AS A DEFENSE TO AN ACTION FOR
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION - THE KENTUCKY
POSITION
INTRODUCTION
In a malicious prosecution action, the defendant often
raises the defense that he relied upon the advice of an attorney
in setting the proceedings in motion against the plaintiff.
Under certain conditions, such reliance can provide a complete
defense for the defendant. In Kentucky the law controlling this
defense, although well settled, is not simple; and in order for a
court to rule such a defense conclusive as a matter of law, the
defendant must satisfy a number of specific and subtle require-
ments. These requirements deal not only with the defendant's
own actions and intentions in seeking and relying upon coun-
sel's advice but also with counsel's capability to give advice
upon which the defendant may safely rely.
In light of these requirements, to say simply that reliance
upon "advice of counsel is a complete defense to an action for
malicious prosecution"' is a misleading over-simplification and
is especially serious when uttered by a high court in a factually
complex and unusual case. This recently occurred in Worley v.
Columbia Gas, Inc.,2 wherein the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals coupled this overly simplistic statement with an incorrect
and incomplete statement of the requirements necessary under
Kentucky law for a valid advice of counsel defense.3 Although
these statements were only dicta, when taken together, in light
of the unusual facts of that case, they could have a serious
tendency to mislead practitioners not only as to the complexity
of the advice of counsel defense but also as to the requirements
necessary to sustain it.
In order to convey a correct and complete understanding
of the "advice of counsel" defense in malicious prosecution
actions, its operation will be detailed in the following sections,
I Worley v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 491 F.2d 256, 263 (6th Cir. 1973) (emphasis
added).
2 Id. at 256.
3 Id. at 263, 264.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
along with the conditions precedent and subsequent necessary
to successfully invoke this defense in Kentucky. This effort,
however, must be prefaced by a brief and general exposition of
the elements necessary to sustain an action for malicious prose-
cution. To that end, it first should be noted that a malicious
prosecution action arises from a prior, unsuccessful action. The
plaintiff in the first action becomes the defendant in the subse-
quent malicious prosecution action, and the defendant in the
prior action becomes the plaintiff. To avoid confusion of par-
ties, the titles "defendant" and "plaintiff" will be used
throughout this comment to identify the defendant and plain-
tiff in the malicious prosecution action.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
In Kentucky, five elements are necessary to sustain a
cause of action for malicious prosecution. Each of these must
affirmatively appear; the absence of any one of them will void
the action.4 The elements are: (1) the defendant must have
been the proximate cause setting the law in motion against the
plaintiff in the original action;5 (2) he must have done so mali-
ciously;' (3) his action must have been instigated without prob-
able cause;' (4) the prior action must have been terminated
favorably to the plaintiff;8 and (5) the plaintiff must have suf-
See Puckett v. Clark, 410 S.W.2d 154 (Ky. 1966); Cravens v. Long, 257 S.W.2d
548 (Ky. 1953); Harter v. Lewis Stores, Inc., 240 S.W.2d 86 (Ky. 1951); Smith v. Smith,
178 S.W.2d 613 (Ky. 1944).
5 Cravens v. Long, 257 S.W.2d 548 (Ky. 1953); Bazzel v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 262
S.W. 966 (Ky. 1924); McClarty v. Bickel, 159 S.W. 783 (Ky. 1913). A cause of action
for malicious prosecution may result from either prior criminal or prior civil proceed-
ings. Cravens v. Long, supra.
I Cravens v. Long, 257 S.W.2d 548 (Ky. 1953); Lexington Cab Co. v. Terrell, 137
S.W.2d 721 (Ky. 1940). However, malice may be inferred from want of probable cause.
Sweeny v. Howard, 447 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. 1969); Cravens v. Long, supra; Hendrie v.
Perkins, 42 S.W.2d 502 (Ky. 1931); Davis v. Brady, 291 S.W. 412 (Ky. 1927). Whether
or not such malice exists, however, is a question for the jury under the circumstances
of each case. Bowles v. Katzman, 214 S.W.2d 1021 (Ky. 1948); Mosier v. McFarland,
106 S.W.2d 641 (Ky. 1937).
Freeman v. Logan, 475 S.W.2d 636 (Ky. 1972); Flynn v. Songer, 399 S.W.2d 491
(Ky. 1966); Christopher v. Henry, 143 S.W.2d 1069 (Ky. 1940). However, while malice
may be inferred from lack of probable cause, lack of probable cause may never be
inferred from evidence of malice. Puckett v. Clark, 410 S.W.2d 154 (Ky. 1966); Cravens
v. Long, 257 S.W.2d 548 (Ky. 1953); Emler v. Fox, 189 S.W. 469 (Ky. 1916).
8 Freeman v. Logan, 475 S.W.2d 636 (Ky. 1972); Massengale v. Lester, 403 S.W.2d
697 (Ky. 1966); Blackenship v. Staton, 348 S.W.2d 925 (Ky. 1961); Conder v. Morri-
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fered some damage or incurred some expense in defending him-
self in that action These requirements are consistent with the
original development of this cause of action' and echo those
required in the majority of jurisdictions."
The cause of action for malicious prosecution represents a
policy consideration in favor of protecting defendants from un-
justifiable litigation by giving them recourse against those who
wrongfully invoke legal proceedings against them.'2 These in-
terests, however, are counterbalanced in most jurisdictions by
public policies favoring (1) the exposure of wrongdoing and
crime' 3 and (2) free access to civil courts to determine the rights
of the parties, without fear of suits for damages if unsuccess-
ful.'4 As a result, malicious prosecution actions, in the majority
of jurisdictions, are not favored in the law. Kentucky is among
the majority."
OPERATION OF ADVICE OF COUNSEL AS A DEFENSE TO MALICIOUS
PROSECUTION
One of the most frequently and successfully asserted de-
fenses to suits for malicious prosecution is the claim that the
defendant consulted an attorney and relied upon his advice in
instigating the action against the plaintiff. The Kentucky
Court of Appeals first recognized this defense in 1891, when it
stated that a reliance on advice of counsel would serve to make
sion, 121 S.W.2d 930 (Ky. 1938). An exception to this condition obtains where the prior
conviction or unfavorable termination was procured by fraud, perjury, or corruption.
Freeman v. Logan, supra; Taylor v. Nohalty, 404 S.W.2d 448 (Ky. 1966).
1 Punitive damages depend on malice. Jefferson Dry Goods Co. v. Stoess, 199
S.W.2d 994 (Ky. 1947). Since costs are awarded upon favorable termination of civil
cases, special damages must be sustained. Harter v. Lewis Stores, Inc., 240 S.W.2d 86
(Ky. 1951). As the Court of Appeals explained, in Woods v. Finnel, 76 Ky. (13 Bush)
628 (1878):
[Wihere the reputation has not been assailed, or the defendant imprisoned,
or his property seized, or its use prevented, the damage should be confined
to the loss of time and reasonable expenses incurred in the defense of the
action, beyond the ordinary costs.
'o W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 835 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
" 54 C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution § 4 (1948).
22 PROSSER, supra note 10, at 834, 851.
'3 Id. at 834.
Id. at 851.
"Reid v. True, 302 S.W.2d 846 (Ky. 1957); J.B. Colt Co. v. Grubbs, 268 S.W. 817
(Ky. 1925).
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out a case of probable cause tG-that is, the attorney's advice
that a valid cause of action existed would provide the defen-
dant with probable cause for bringing the original action. Since
lack of probable cause in initiating the original proceeding is
one of the elements essential to sustaining an action for mali-
cious prosecution, a finding of probable cause was (and still is)
fatal to the plaintiff's cause.
In the early cases, mere reliance upon advice of counsel did
not conclusively establish probable cause; conclusiveness was
dependent upon the strength of the case as developed at trial.17
A mere assurance by an attorney that the defendant was justi-
fied in setting the law in motion against the plaintiff, when it
was clear that the opposite was true would not create a valid
defense. A claim of reliance would not operate to protect a
defendant who wrongfully used legal process against the plain-
tiff.1
Between 1896 and 1925, the Kentucky Court used several
different phrases to describe the operation of this defense, var-
iously indicating that advice of counsel would: (1) establish the
existence of probable cause,'9 (2) exempt the party acting upon
such advice from the imputation of proceeding maliciously and
" Rives v. Wood, 15 S.W. 131 (Ky. 1891); Burke v. Rhodes, 13 Ky. L. Rptr. 431
(1891).
17 Rives v. Wood, 15 S.W. 131 (Ky. 1891); Burke v. Rhodes, 13 Ky. L. Rptr. 431
(1891).
11 An action for abuse of process is to be distinguished from an action for malicious
prosecution; the prior action lies in cases where legal process is employed (and thus
an action commenced) in order to accomplish a purpose other than a redress of a
wrong. In actions for abuse of process, therefore, the purpose for which the action or
proceeding was initiated is the only thing of importance. Lack of probable cause to
sustain the prior action or that the prior action terminated in the plaintiff's favor need
not be proven.
An action for malicious prosecution will lie, however, when civil or criminal pro-
ceedings are commenced without justification, that is, when the original plaintiff mali-
ciously caused process to be issued.
An example commonly given is as follows: where an innocent person is prosecuted
for a criminal offense, without reasonable grounds (probable cause) to believe he is
guilty of that offense, the action is for malicious prosecution; if a person is prosecuted
by another in order to collect payment of a debt, the action is for abuse of process.
For a more complete, though general, analysis of the distinction between these two
causes of action see, Stoll Oil Refining Co. v. Pierce, 337 S.W.2d 263 (Ky. 1960);
PROSSER § 121.
" Ahrens & Ott Mfg. Co. v. Hoeher, 51 S.W. 194 (Ky. 1899); Anderson v. Colum-
bia Fin. & Trust Co., 50 S.W. 40 (Ky. 1899).
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without probable cause,20 and (3) evidence the existence of
probable cause (but not conclusively establish it).2" Today,
however, different jurisdictions use these three phrases to indi-
cate distinctly different effects arising from the invocation of
this defense. Some jurisdictions hold that establishing the ex-
istence of probable cause prevents the showing of the lack of
probable cause necessary to sustain the malicious prosecution
action.2 Other jurisdictions exempt the party acting on coun-
sel's advice from the imputation of proceeding maliciously and
without probable cause, negating two of the elements necessary
to the cause of action, viz., a showing of a lack of probable
cause and a showing that the action was maliciously com-
menced.? In contrast, some courts say that if the defendant
does not conclusively establish the existence of probable cause,
but merely provides evidence of its existence, reliance on ad-
vice of counsel creates a rebuttable presumption that probable
cause existed.24
While a literal reading of the Kentucky decisions of the
1896 to 1925 period would indicate that the Court of Appeals,
too, held three different views of the operation of advice of
counsel, it is more likely that the Court was only giving fuller
expression to the 1891 view.? That view, emerging from this
early period without special comment by the Court, held that
reliance upon the advice of counsel conclusively establishes the
existence of probable cause. As thus stated, the defense has
remained largely unchanged and operates in like fashion today
in Kentucky" and in the majority of jurisdictions.? It is likely
that the variations in language during the 1896 to 1925 period
allude to what later developed as separate and distinct condi-
21 Stanhope v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry., 276 S.W. 567 (Ky. 1925); Lancaster
v. Langston, 36 S.W. 521 (Ky. 1896).
21 Elmer v. Fox, 189 S.W. 469 (Ky. 1916).
2 Tate v. Connel, 416 P.2d 213 (Ariz. 1966); Adler v. Segal, 108 So. 2d 773 (Fla.
1959); Peoples Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Neuhoff, 407 S.W.2d 190 (Tenn. 1966).
" Moore v. York, 371 P.2d 469 (Okla. 1962).
21 Peppas v. Miles, 61 S.E.2d 429 (Ga. 1950).
21 This was the view introduced by the Kentucky Court in Rives v. Wood, 15 S.W.
131 (Ky. 1891) and Burke v. Rhodes, 13 Ky. L. Rptr. 431 (1891).
1, Hale v. Baker, 483 S.W.2d 133 (Ky. 1972).
21 Id. See also Tate v. Connel, 416 P.2d 213 (Ariz. 1966); Adler v. Segal, 108 So.
2d 773 (Fla. 1959); Peoples Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Neuhoff, 407 S.W.2d 190 (Tenn.
1966).
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tions precedent and subsequent to a valid advice of counsel
defense. These conditions will be covered more fully herein-
after.
Since lack of probable cause for bringing the original ac-
tion is an essential element of subsequent action for malicious
prosecution," if the defendant can prevent the plaintiff from
showing a lack of probable cause, he will have a complete de-
fense in the second action.29 Just how reliance on advice of
counsel operates to aid the defendant in this regard may best
be described as follows: Probable cause has been held to be
established when the facts upon which the action was insti-
tuted would have sufficed to induce a man of ordinary prud-
ence to believe the plaintiff was guilty of the offense charged
or that a valid cause of action against him existed.30 This calls
for a conclusion by the defendant as to whether or not the facts
within his knowledge are sufficient to support the instigation
of legal proceedings. An ordinary man is presumed to know the
law, and a defendant runs a considerable risk in determining
whether he has probable cause if he does not consult an attor-
ney. His judgment as to the sufficiency of his factual basis may
be affected by the emotion-charged atmosphere of the situation
in which he finds himself, and the result may be a mistaken
decision to prosecute. Indeed, mistakes of this nature often
form the basis of malicious prosecution actions. This problem,
under the Kentucky and majority view, is entirely avoided by
reliance on the advice of counsel. When the defendant places
the facts before an attorney and asks for his conclusion as to
their sufficiency, the lawyer's advice becomes the reasonable
grounds upon which the defendant's belief in the sufficiency of
his factual basis can be placed.' As the Court of Appeals stated
" Freeman v. Logan, 475 S.W.2d 636 (Ky. 1972); Flynn v. Songer, 399 S.W.2d 491
(Ky. 1966); Christopher v. Henry, 143 S.W.2d 1069 (Ky. 1940).
n, Freeman v. Logan, 475 S.W.2d 636 (Ky. 1972); Flynn v. Songer, 399 S.W.2d 491
(Ky. 1966); Christopher v. Henry, 143 S.W.2d 1069 (Ky. 1940).
Haseldon v. York, 112 S.W.2d 984 (Ky. 1938); Westerfield v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 94 S.W.2d 986 (Ky. 1936); Stephens v. Gravit, 124 S.W. 414 (Ky. 1910); Blair v.
Meshew, 7 Ky. Opin. 103 (1873). As can be readily seen, advice of counsel is not the
only means by which probable cause may be established. See Smith v. Kidd, 246
S.W.2d 155 (Ky. 1952); Stamper v. McCally, 229 S.W.2d 54 (Ky. 1950); Figuccion v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 116 S.W.2d 291 (Ky. 1938).
31 See Lancaster v. Langston, 36 S.W. 521 (Ky. 1896).
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in Lancaster v. Langston,31 "[w]hether the facts amount to
probable cause is the very question submitted to counsel in
such cases, and when the client is instructed that they do, he
has taken all the precautions demanded of a good citizen. 33
It is important to note that the defendant's complete de-
fense is not voided by the attorney's mistake as to the legal
sufficiency of the factual basis for the action.34 This result is
correct, because the attorney's advice that the facts are
sufficient, not the insufficient facts themselves, is the ground
upon which the defendant's belief rests. 5 If the defendant de-
cides by himself, without seeking an attorney's advice, that he
has sufficient grounds upon which to proceed, no such defense
is available to him. Indeed, such an erroneous decision is often
the primary basis of the plaintiff's malicious prosecution action
in the first place.36
In Kentucky, there is no requirement that this defense
must be specifically pleaded in order to be raised. 7 The defen-
dant must, however, satisfy certain requirements before this
defense becomes available to him. If any one of these
requirements is not satisfied, reliance on counsel's advice, will
not establish probable cause. 8 At best, counsel's advice then
becomes only a factor to be considered in mitigation. These
requirements will now be considered.
Good Faith
Good faith on the part of the defendant in seeking and
relying on advice of counsel was the original, basic requirement
necessary to insure that reliance on advice of counsel would be
a conclusive defense. 39 Over the years, certain criteria have
evolved to determine whether or not this broad good faith re-
32 Id.
Id. at 522.
' Baber v. Fitzgerald, 224 S.W.2d 135 (Ky. 1949); L. & N. Ry. v. Sharp, 140
S.W.2d 383 (Ky. 1940); Lancaster v. Langston, 36 S.W. 521 (Ky. 1896).
See Lancaster v. Langston, 36 S.W. 521 (Ky. 1896).
' PROSSER, supra note 10, at 842.
n Cravens v. Long, 257 S.W.2d 548 (Ky. 1953); Emler v. Fox, 189 S.W. 469 (Ky.
1916).
See Puckett v. Clark, 410 S.W.2d 154 (Ky. 1966); Peel v. Bramblett, 204 S.W.2d
565 (Ky. 1947); Figuccion v. Prudential Ins. Co., 116 S.W.2d 291 (Ky. 1938); Cracraft
v. McDaniel, 294 S.W. 812 (Ky. 1927).
3, See Ahrens & Ott Mfg. Co. v. Hoeher, 51 S.W. 194 (Ky. 1899).
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quirement has been met; these include the "full and fair disclo-
sure" test' as well as various tests to determine whether the
attorney consulted is qualified to give competent advice upon
which a defendant can rely.' Recognizing that these tests rep-
resent the primary constituents of the broad good faith require-
ment, the Court of Appeals seems, through repeated use, to
have transformed them into independent standards and has
gradually dropped the "good faith" phraseology.4 2 As a result
the dual requirements of (1) seeking counsel's advice in good
faith and (2) relying on counsel's advice in good faith have
become rather narrowly defined and are seldom invoked. Still,
these requirements have not been completely abandoned,4 3 and
an analysis of their present, albeit restricted, form and opera-
tion is certainly in order.
In 1896, the Kentucky Court delineated the requirement
that the defendant must seek counsel's advice in good faith in
Lancaster v. Langston," when it said "to manifest the good
faith of the party, it is important that he should resort to a
professional advisor . . . [and] [h]e cannot . . .make such
resort a mere cover for the prosecution."45 Since probable cause
is established by a reasonable belief that the party against
whom the original action was brought was guilty of some of-
fense or that a valid cause of action against him existed, a
belief by the party who initiated the original action that his
opponent is innocent or that the suit is groundless makes the
establishment of probable cause impossible and thereby voids
the advice of counsel defense. Subsequently seeking and ob-
11 See Puckett v. Clark, 410 S.W.2d 154 (Ky. 1966); Smith v. Kidd, 246 S.W.2d
155 (Ky. 1952); Lexington Cab Co. v. Terrell, 137 S.W.2d 721 (Ky. 1940); Figuccion v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 116 S.W.2d 291 (Ky. 1938); Hendrie v. Perkins, 42 S.W.2d 502
(Ky. 1931); Shoemaker v. Southwestern Petroleum Co., 281 S.W. 533 (Ky. 1926);
Bowman v. Combs, 273 S.W. 719 (Ky. 1925).
1, See Puckett v. Clark, 410 S.W.2d 154 (Ky. 1966); Smith v. Kidd, 246 S.W.2d
155 (Ky. 1952); Davis v. Brady, 291 S.W. 412 (Ky. 1927); J.B. Colt Co. v. Grubbs, 268
S.W. 817 (Ky. 1925); Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Hamlin, 235 S.W. 4 (Ky. 1921);
Emler v. Fox, 189 S.W. 469 (Ky. 1916); Dyer v. Singer Sewing Mach. Co., 175 S.W.
1037 (Ky. 1915).
42 See, e.g., Puckett v. Clark, 410 S.W.2d 154 (Ky. 1966); Smith v. Kidd, 246
S.W.2d 155 (Ky. 1952); Stephens v. Gravit, 124 S.W. 414 (Ky. 1910).
41 See, e.g., Mesker v. McCourt, 44 S.W. 975 (Ky. 1898); Lancaster v. Langston,
36 S.W. 521 (Ky. 1896).
4 Lancaster v. Langston, 36 S.W. 521 (Ky. 1896).
11 Id. at 522.
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taining counsel's advice cannot remedy this and provides no
defense."
Similarly, if, during the course of the action, any facts
come to the attention of the defendant which would lead a
reasonable man to believe that the plaintiff is innocent or that
a cause of action against him is groundless, the complaining
party may not continue to rely on the advice of counsel pre-
viously given. That advice no longer constitutes a conclusive
defense." Although the cases treating these good faith require-
ments are old, the principles they outline are sound and are
supported by more recent decisions in other jurisdictions.18
Full and Fair Disclosure
Full and fair disclosure of the facts of the case by the
defendant, before obtaining and relying on counsel's advice, is
a necessary condition of proceeding in good faith. Although the
Kentucky Court has held that only the material facts of the
case need be disclosed to satisfy this requirement,49 it has often
said that if all the facts are fully and fairly disclosed the de-
fense will be conclusive." This should not be viewed as an
inconsistency in the rule, but rather as advice to defendants
who wish to run no risk that their defense will not be conclu-
sive. If the plaintiff challenges the fullness of the defendant's
factual disclosure and it is found that the defendant did not
place all the facts before counsel, it becomes a question for the
jury as to whether or not the facts disclosed satisfy the require-
ments.5 The danger is that very often, the jury will reason that
the facts not disclosed ". . . were facts which should have been
disclosed to the attorney, and. . . that in failing to make such
disclosure . . .[the defendant] has not met the conditions of
I4 d.
'7 Mesker v. McCourt, 44 S.W. 975 (Ky. 1898); Lancaster v. Langston, 36 S.W.
521 (Ky. 1896).
11 See Freides v. Sani-Mode Mfg. Co., 211 N.E.2d 286 (Il. 1965); Young v. Young,
251 So. 2d 835 (La. 1971); McIntyre v. Meyer, 136 N.W.2d 351 (S.D. 1965).
" Puckett v. Clark, 410 S.W.2d 154 (Ky. 1966); Reid v. True, 302 S.W.2d 846 (Ky.
1957).
0 Puckett v. Clark, 410 S.W.2d 154 (Ky. 1966); Smith v. Kidd, 246 S.W.2d 155,
159 (Ky. 1952). See Lexington Cab Co. v. Terrell, 137 S.W.2d 721 (Ky. 1940).
51 Puckett v. Clark, 410 S.W.2d 154 (Ky. 1966); Smith v. Kidd, 246 S.W.2d 155
(Ky. 1952); Cracraft v. McDaniel, 294 S.W. 812 (Ky. 1927).
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the rule .... -52 However, if all the facts have been disclosed,
the condition is satisfied and the defense becomes conclusive
as a matter of law, entitling the defendant to a peremptory
instruction to that effect (provided these facts were fairly pre-
sented and the other necessary conditions specified in this com-
ment are met) .53 As a practical matter, therefore, a defendant
who wishes to rely on advice of counsel as a complete defense
runs considerably less risk if he has disclosed all the facts to
his attorney, -rather than only those facts which he considers
material.
Only a full disclosure of the actual facts themselves will
satisfy the rule; conclusions drawn as to the existence or nonex-
istence of facts are not sufficient to sustain the defense. 4 The
Court of Appeals addressed this requirement in Shoemaker v.
Southwestern Petroleum CO.,-" a case involving a dispute as to
whether an agreement had been reached for the tapping of a
gas well. Therein it stated:
If the appellant's version was correct he was not criminally
liable for making such connections. This was a point on which
advice of counsel was important and it cannot be said that
[the defendant] . . . fully or fairly informed counsel of the
facts relative thereto by merely saying that [the plaintiff]
"was trying to claim a contract, but he never had any." This
conclusion assumed the nonexistence of controverted facts,
and advice of counsel predicated on such an assumption
would be no defense .... 56
Misrepresentation of the facts will also void the defense.17
In making a full disclosure of the facts, the defendant must
lay before counsel not only all those facts within his knowledge,
but also all information obtainable through the use of reasona-
ble care and diligence. 8 As the Court stated in Ahrens v. Ott
52 Figuccion v. Prudential Ins. Co., 116 S.W.2d 291, 292 (Ky. 1938).
'3Puckett v. Clark, 410 S.W.2d 154 (Ky. 1966); Reid v. True, 302 S.W.2d 846 (Ky.
1957); Smith v. Kidd, 246 S.W.2d 155 (Ky. 1952).
11 Shoemaker v. Southwestern Petroleum Co., 281 S.W. 533, 535 (Ky. 1926).
Id. at 533.
11 Id. at 535.
51 Bowman v. Combs, 273 S.W. 719 (Ky. 1925).
51 Puckett v. Clark, 410 S.W.2d 154 (Ky. 1966); Smith v. Kidd, 246 S.W.2d 155
(Ky. 1952); Ppel v. Bramblett, 204 S.W.2d 565 (Ky. 1947); Lexington Cab Co. v.
Terrell, 137 S.W.2d 721 (Ky. 1940); Figuccion v. Prudential Ins. Co., 116 S.W.2d 291
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Manufacturing Co. :
He who consults an attorney about a matter affecting a third
person ought to use that care which men of ordinary prudence
would ordinarily use in matters of like magnitude. Less than
this would not show good faith."
The majority of jurisdictions, however, are not this strict
and merely require that the defendant disclose the facts known
to him." In view of the heavy burden placed on the plaintiff in
malicious prosecution actions, this extra burden placed on de-
fendants in Kentucky seems both equitable and reasonable, as
it: (1) serves to prevent the defendants from isolating them-
selves from further inquiry into the case; (2) helps insure that
the attorney will have all the facts reasonably available on
which to base his advice; and (3) demands an exercise of due
care by defendants, requiring them to look for exonerating facts
before rushing off to the courts. This additional burden on the
defendant is further justified by the origin of the full and fair
disclosure rule in the requirement that the defendant have pro-
ceeded in good faith. A showing of good faith seems to require
the exercise of reasonable care in obtaining all the available
facts before subjecting a third party to the stress of litigation.
Kentucky's stringent full and fair disclosure requirement
thus requires the defendant to show more than that he sued on
the advice of an attorney. Not surprisingly, when a plaintiff is
faced with an advice of counsel defense, he most often seeks to
invalidate the defense by showing that the full disclosure re-
quirement has not been satisfied. Since the defendant often
presents only his most righteous position and often leaves out
those facts which might establish the innocence of the plaintiff,
the argument that the defendant relied on advice of counsel
can easily be rebutted on cross-examination by showing that
there was not a fair and truthful disclosure.
There are two situations, however, in which a defendant
who does not make a full and fair disclosure may still rely on
advice of counsel as a complete defense. First, the defendant
(Ky. 1938); Hendrie v. Perkins, 42 S.W.2d 502 (Ky. 1931); Bowman v. Combs, 273
S.W. 719 (Ky. 1925).
551 S.W. 194 (Ky. 1899).
"Id. at 196.
" PROSSER, supra note 10, at 843.
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need not repeat material facts that the attorney already
knows.12 As the Court of Appeals has stated:
[I]f the appellants knew that the attorneys by previous in-
formation, no matter how obtained, knew of the nature of the
controversy . . . it was unnecessary to state the facts over
again at the time this advice was given.63
Second, if after hearing the defendant's incomplete statement,
the attorney makes an independent investigation before giving
his advice, his advice will satisfy the full and fair disclosure
requirement for the defendant. 4 This latter exception rests
upon the assumption that the attorney has used good faith and
reasonable diligence in conducting the investigation.
Counsel's Qualifications
In Kentucky, as in the majority of jurisdictions, 5 the de-
fense of reliance on advice of counsel is valid only if the person
consulted, and upon whose advice the defendant relies, is a
reputable, competent,67 practicing attorney." He may be ei-
ther a private attorney or a public prosecutor, 9 but in any
event he must be disinterested and unbiased. Advice of mag-
istrates and others connected with the law who are not practic-
ing attorneys cannot be relied upon.7'
It should be noted that the standards requiring counsel to
be reputable and competent are seldom used to challenge the
advice of counsel defense. It has been observed, in this connec-
tion, that:
[a] plaintiff in an action for malicious prosecution who chal-
62 Illinois Cent. Ry. v. Anderson, 268 S.W. 311, 312 (Ky. 1925).
11 Id. at 312.
64 Hale v. Baker, 483 S.W.2d 133 (Ky. 1972).
'5 PROSSER, supra note 10, at 844.
" Davis v. Brady, 291 S.W. 412 (Ky. 1927).
e7 Stanhope v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry., 276 S.W. 567 (Ky. 1925); J.B. Colt
Co. v. Grubbs, 268 S.W. 817 (Ky. 1925); Stephens v. Gravit, 124 S.W. 414 (Ky. 1910).
' Stephens v. Gravit, 124 S.W. 414 (Ky. 1910).
"' Smith v. Kidd, 246 S.W.2d 155 (Ky. 1952); J.B. Colt Co. v. Grubbs, 268 S.W.
817 (Ky. 1925); Dyer v. Singer Sewing Mach. Co., 175 S.W. 1037 (Ky. 1915).
70 Puckett v. Clark, 410 S.W.2d 154 (Ky. 1966); Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v.
Hamlin, 235 S.W. 4 (Ky. 1921); Emler v. Fox, 189 S.W. 469 (Ky. 1916); Smith v.
Fields, 129 S.W. 325 (Ky. 1910).
7' Stephens v. Gravit, 124 S.W. 414 (Ky. 1910).
[Vol. 63
COMMENTS
lenges the reputation of counsel who gave the defendant the
advice usually finds himself trying another case than his own,
which situation at once attracts attention by the desperate
character of the enterprise. Consequently, such plaintiff does
not desire to make an issue of the competency of counsel. 2
Plaintiffs have more frequently attacked the nature of the
advice given by focusing on the requirement that the attorney
consulted be disirlterested and unbiased. Only four cases liti-
gating this requirement have ever been presented to the Court
of Appeals.73 Of those four, Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v.
Hamlin74 is the leading case defining disqualifying interests.
Therein, the Court held that
• . .the interest which would disqualify the attorney should
grow out of the fact that he was financially interested in the
outcome, or that he was related to the parties, or that he was
so biased because of enmity against the accused, or some
other equally substantial reason [as would keep him] from
giving good faith advice. 5
What constitutes a disqualifying interest is not a matter for
jury speculation, but rather is a matter of law requiring a defin-
ing instruction.7
The fact that the attorney consulted was the defendant's
regularly employed attorney, who had represented him in pre-
vious litigation, will not render the attorney interested under
the rule.7 Nor will the fact that the attorney assisted the defen-
dant in the investigation of the case disqualify him.78 The Court
has held, however, that advice given by an attorney during the
excitement of a trial may not result in a complete defense,
because the facts may show, as a matter of law, that under the
circumstances the advice was not given "by a wholly disinter-
ested and unbiased attorney."79 In such situations, a trial court
11 Annot., 81 A.L.R. 516, 517 (1932).
73 Puckett v. Clark, 410 S.W.2d 154 (Ky. 1966); Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v.
Hamlin, 235 S.W. 4 (Ky. 1921); Emler v. Fox, 189 S.W. 469 (Ky. 1916). Smith v.
Fields, 129 S.W. 325 (Ky. 1910).
7, 235 S.W. 4 (Ky. 1921).
11 Id. at 7.
76 Id.
' Id.
7 Puckett v. Clark, 410 S.W.2d 154 (Ky. 1966).
7' Smith v. Fields, 129 S.W. 325, 326 (Ky. 1910).
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would not be authorized to give the defendant a peremptory
instruction.'"
The attorney himself may be liable in an action for mali-
cious' prosecution if he, in bad faith, prosecutes or causes to be
prosecuted a charge he knows to be groundless.8 ' Moreover, a
client may be held liable on agency principles for the acts of
his attorney, when it is shown that he ratified those acts.'
Collusion or conspiracy between the attorney and the client to
prosecute a groundless suit will obviously void any advice of
counsel defense a defendant might assert, because of the lack
of good faith demonstrated. 3
Worley: THE SIXTH CIRCUIT INTERPRETATION
No "guidance" is more misleading, no "kindly light" is more
will-o'-the wisp than an obiter dictum sometimes contrives to
be.8 4
The Worley 5 case is the Sixth Circuit's most recent brush
with a Kentucky malicious prosecution action. Therein, the
court reversed the plaintiff's lower court victory and held that
he had not established any of the elements of the prima facie
case of malicious prosecution." Lack of any one of those ele-
ments would have been sufficient grounds for reversal; the
court, however, took the opportunity to say that
[elven if Worley had been able to establish a prima facie
case, the defendants would have had an affirmative defense
in that all recommendations for obtaining warrants came
from an attorney. Under Kentucky law such advice of counsel
is a complete defense to an action for malicious prosecution."
This simplistic generalization is misleading, for under Ken-
tucky law, as the preceeding discussion makes clear, much
more is required for an advice of counsel defense than the mere
fact that the advice relied on came from an attorney. Indeed,
80 Id.
, See Miller v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 89 S.W. 183 (Ky. 1905).
82 54 C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution § 66 (1948).
Hamilton v. Smith, 39 Mich. 222 (1878).
4 Sorrell v. Smith [1925] A.C. 700, 743 (Lord Sumner).
Worley v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 491 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 263.
87 Id.
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the only indication that the court considered any of the afore-
mentioned tests in determining whether the defendant had a
valid advice of counsel defense is found in the court's statement
that "[tihere is no indication in the record that attorney
Clarke was operating with insufficient facts ... "88 This
statement implies that the defense is complete when the court
is satisfied that the attorney did not predicate his advice to the
defendant to proceed with the original suit upon insufficient
facts. To rely on such an assumption would be a mistake. It
must be remembered that whether or not sufficient facts have
been given to counsel is a question of fact for a jury and that,
under the full and fair disclosure requirement, the burden is on
the defendant to show that he fully and fairly informed counsel
of the facts.89 Although the court stated that there was no indi-
cation that the attorney was without sufficient facts, neither
was there any indication in the court's opinion that the attor-
ney had been fully and fairly informed of the facts by the
defendants. Nor was it indicated that the attorney had inde-
pendent knowledge of the facts or had obtained the facts
through independent investigation."
More disturbing, however, is the Sixth Circuit's incorrect
statement of the requirements for a valid advice of counsel
defense. In its order denying a petition for rehearing, the court
said:
Kentucky law requires only that an attorney be in possession
of all the facts, not that he be disinterested, for the defense
of advice of counsel to be valid in a malicious prosecution
case. 
9
Under Kentucky law, the attorney consulted must be disinter-
ested and unbiased for reliance on his advice to be a valid
defense to a malicious prosecution action.12 Although certain
prior involvements with a client or his case (as noted in a
uId.
, Figuccion v. Prudential Ins. Co., 116 S.W.2d 291 (Ky. 1938).
o See Hale v. Baker, 483 S.W.2d 133 (Ky. 1972); Illinois Cent. Ry. v. Anderson,
268 S.W. 311 (Ky. 1925).
* Worley v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 491 F.2d 256, 264 (6th Cir. 1973) (emphasis
added).
12 Puckett v. Clark, 410 S.W.2d 154 (Ky. 1966); Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v.
Hamlin, 235 S.W. 4 (Ky. 1921); Emler v. Fox, 189 S.W. 469 (Ky. 1916); Smith v.
Fields, 129 S.W. 325 (Ky. 1910).
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preceding section) have been held not to disqualify an attorney
as interested under the rule,93 it might have been a close ques-
tion, in Worley, whether or not the attorney would have quali-
fied as disinterested and unbiased. The court thus relied upon
a pat, technically incorrect statement of the law to resolve what
may have been a compelling issue.
Beyond this, the peculiar facts of Worley raise additional
questions worthy of special consideration. In that case, all par-
ties were engaged in the construction of a gas pipeline. Worley,
a subcontractor, claimed that he and the contractor under
whom he worked had entered into an agreement whereby the
contractor was to make good any overdrafts issued by Worley
in meeting his payroll. The contractor did, in fact, retain an
attorney to pay off payroll checks issued by Worley in return
for release from any lien claims the recipients of those checks
might have had against the project. However, when certain of
Worley's checks were dishonored by the bank for insufficient
funds and Worley asserted that the contractor had made ar-
rangements to cover such checks, the contractor denied ever
making the agreement. Moreover, when the recipients of the
"cold" checks went to the attorney's office seeking payment, he
informed them that in his opinion an offense had been commit-
ted and that they were entitled to obtain warrants against Wor-
ley. The attorney then determined which parties were willing
to sign complaints and escorted them to the courthouse to do
so. There is no indication in the opinion that these people
sought this advice from the attorney. Moreover, it is quite ob-
vious that no attorney-client relationship ever existed between
them. Indeed, it is likely that these people sought no more from
this attorney than payment of the checks they had received. It
appears then that the attorney, while acting as an agent of the
defendant (who was engaged in a dispute with Worley over the
issuance of the checks), may have actively encouraged the re-
cipients of those checks to prosecute Worley. In the subsequent
suit for malicious prosecution against the contractor, two of the
contractor's principal officers, the pipeline company, and the
public utility, the defendants sought to rely upon the "advice"
11 See Puckett v. Clark, 410 S.W.2d 154 (Ky. 1966); Kroger Grocery & Baking Co.
v. Hamlin, 235 S.W. 4 (Ky. 1921).
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given to the third party checkholders as a complete defense.
This is a very unusual situation, for those who usually wish to
rely upon the advice of counsel defense are those who have
sought the advice of the attorney themselves and have relied
upon the advice which was given to them in deciding to insti-
tute legal proceedings.
This raises the interesting question of whether or not an
attorney's possibly unsolicited advice, rendered to a third party
on some matter, can be a valid defense for the person who
actually employed him concerning that matter but who did not
himself take any action in reliance on the advice. No Kentucky
cases have commented on this precise issue, and no other juris-
diction seems to have definitely resolved it. One possible argu-
ment is that the issue should be analyzed in terms of whether
or not the attorney's advice would have been a valid defense,
under the previously discussed requirements, if the advice had
been rendered to the defendants and not to the third parties.
This approach would be unsatisfactory, however, for it would
resolve the problem by divorcing it from the facts which gave
rise to it. It would seem more likely that the defense of advice
of counsel would be valid for defendants, in this situation, only
if the defense would have been valid for those third parties who
actually took action against the plaintiff. This assumes that
the good faith and other essential requirements could be satis-
fied, not only by these third persons, but also by the attorney
and those who employed him.
In Worley, under this theor.y, the defendants might have
been hard pressed to successfully assert their advice of counsel
defense. The third parties to whom the advice was given had
not employed the attorney, nor is it likely that they sought his
advice. Therefore, they were not advised by an attorney whom
they had consulted and retained, but were merely advised by
an agent-attorney acting for and employed by a defendant.
Obviously, this attorney might not satisfy Kentucky's "disin-
terested and unbiased counsel" requirement with respect to the
third parties he advised; and, under the aforementioned
theory, that advice might then fail to constitute a defense for
the defendants.
Moreover, in light of Worley's charge of conspiracy on the
part of the defendants to maliciously prosecute him for issu-
ance of "cold" checks, the court should have carefully exam-
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ined these unusual facts for possible good faith violations be-
fore stating that "the defendants would have had an affirma-
tive defense in that all recommendations for obtaining war-
rants came from an attorney."94 Indeed, the facts concerning
the attorney's employment and the lengths to which he went
in assisting the recipients of Worley's checks to obtain warrants
easily lend themselves to the interpretation that violations of
the good faith requirement occurred. As previously noted, any
such violation will void an advice of counsel defense.
CONCLUSION
In Kentucky, to sustain an action for malicious prosecu-
tion the plaintiff must show (among the other necessary ele-
ments, detailed earlier) that the prior action against him by the
defendant was instigated without probable cause." Under Ken-
tucky law, a defendant's reliance on advice of counsel can es-
tablish the existence of probable cause, as a matter of law, and
can thus provide the defendant with a complete defense. 6
However, essential to such a conclusive defense is the satisfac-
tion of numerous specific requirements dealing not only with
the defendant's actions and intentions in seeking and relying
on counsel's advice, but also with counsel's capability to give
advice upon which a defendant could safely rely. These re-
quirements, which evolved from a general good faith standard,
dictate that the defendant must: (1) seek counsel's advice in
good faith;" (2) fully and fairly disclose to such counsel all the
material facts98 available to him through the use of reasonable
care and diligence;99 (3) consult only a reputable, ' compe-
tent,101 practicing attorney 2 who is disinterested and un-
11 Worley v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 491 F.2d 256, 263 (6th Cir. 1973).
Is Freeman v. Logan, 475 S.W.2d 636 (Ky. 1972); Flynn v. Songer, 399 S.W.2d 491
(Ky. 1966); Christopher v. Henry, 143 S.W.2d 1069 (Ky. 1940).
11 Puckett v. Clark, 410 S.W.2d 154 (Ky. 1966); Lancaster v. Langston, 36 S.W.
521 (Ky. 1896).
'7 Lancaster v. Langston, 36 S.W. 521 (Ky. 1896).
Puckett v. Clark, 410 S.W.2d 154 (Ky. 1966); Reid v. True, 302 S.W.2d 846 (Ky.
1957).
,1 Puckett v. Clark, 410 S.W.2d 154 (Ky. 1966); Smith v. Kidd, 246 S.W.2d 155
(Ky. 1952); Peel v. Bramblett, 204 S.W.2d 565 (Ky. 1947).
1' Davis v. Brady, 291 S.W. 412 (Ky. 1927).
0I Stanhope v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry., 276 S.W. 567 (Ky. 1925); J.B. Colt
Co. v. Grubbs, 268 S.W. 817 (Ky. 1925); Stephens v. Gravit, 124 S.W. 414 (Ky. 1910).
,02 Stephens v. Gravit, 124 S.W. 414 (Ky. 1910).
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biased;1 3 and (4) rely on counsel's advice in good faith through-
out the entire action."4 A failure to satisfy each of these re-
quirements will void a defendant's advice of counsel defense.
The Sixth Circuit need not have addressed the advice of coun-
sel defense in disposing of Worley; indeed the above criticized
portion of that decision is pure dictum. Nevertheless, in com-
menting on the advice of counsel question, it became incum-
bent upon the court to correctly state the applicable Kentucky
law and to do so in sufficient depth to detail the proper applica-
tion of that law to the facts of the case. In Worley, the court
did neither. Although the unusual and complex facts of that
case easily lend themselves to an interpretation that strongly
suggests a violation of at least some of the standards required
for a valid advice of counsel defense, the court merely stated
that all advice to obtain warrants came from an attorney and
that such advice was all that was necessary to provide the
defendants with a complete defense.10 5 Such a cursory analysis
is not sufficient, for practitioners may be led to the simplistic
conclusion that the only requirement necessary for a valid ad-
vice of counsel defense is that the advice came from an attor-
ney. Moreover, the court went on to state that ". . . Kentucky
law requires only that an attorney be in possession of all the
facts, not that he be disinterested, for the defense of advice of
counsel to be valid." ' With that incorrect statement, the court
has created more opportunities for confusion, for Kentucky law
demands not only that the attorney consulted be disinterested
and unbiased, but that good faith requirements be satisfied as
well. If the court was determined to comment on the advice of
counsel defense, it could have explored whether (and how), the
Kentucky rules could cope with the novel fact situation of the
Worley case. Instead, it resorted to unwarranted dictum,
which, when read in light of the unusual facts of the case could
have a serious tendency to mislead practitioners as to the na-
ture of this defense and the requirements necessary to success-
fully invoke it in Kentucky.
Eric Steven Smith
1,3 Puckett v. Clark, 410 S.W.2d 154 (Ky. 1966); Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v.
Hamlin, 235 S.W. 4 (Ky. 1921); Emler v. Fox, 189 S.W. 469 (Ky. 1916).
"I Mesker v. McCourt, 44 S.W. 975 (Ky. 1898); Lancaster v. Langston, 36 S.W.
521 (Ky. 1896).
'' Worley v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 491 F.2d 256, 263 (6th Cir. 1973).
I !d. at 264.
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